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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitioner, Tasters Ltd. Inc., ("Tasters"), respectfully
petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for a rehearing with respect
to

the

Court's

decision,

dated

June

19,

1991,

in

the

above-referenced matter.
BACKGROUND
This proceeding was initiated by Tasters seeking review
of the Board

of Review of the

Industrial

Commission's

(the

"Board") decision which held certain individuals to be employees
of Tasters.

In its Brief before the Court, Tasters raised the

issue of whether the Board erred in interpreting or construing
the law under Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(T) in determining employee status.

Tasters argued that the correction-of-error

standard applied in this case as the issue dealt with the propriety of the Board's construction of a statute; i.e., a legal
issue.

On June 19, 1991, this Court issued its Opinion in the

above-captioned matter, concluding that the Board's application
of Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5) to the factual findings in this
matter did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality, and that its factual findings were supported by the substantial evidence.

In reaching this conclusion, this Court rejected

the correction of error standard, and followed an intermediate
standard of review.

ARGUMENT
Based on a recent opinion by the Utah Supreme Court in
Morton International, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, No.
900325 (filed June 24, 1991) ("Morton"), (see Appendix A attached
hereto) Tasters respectfully submits that the Court should apply
the correction-of-error standard, without giving any deference to
the Board's prior decision in reviewing the correctness of the
Board's construction of the applicable statutory provisions.
Beginning on page 5 of the Morton decision, the Supreme
Court provides a detailed discussion of the applicable standards
of review of agency decisions.

More specifically, on page 7 of

the decision, the Supreme Court indicates that it has not always
been clear when the intermediate standard of review or correction-of-error standard of review should be used in reviewing
agency decisions.

By example, the Court cited to Bennett v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986) (correction of error standard used to review Industrial Commission's
interpretation of "employee") and Pinter Construction Corp. v.
Frisby, 678 P.2d 3 05, 3 07 (Utah 1984) (intermediate standard used
to review Industrial Commission's interpretation of "employee.")
On page 8 of the decision, the Supreme Court clarifies this past
confusion by indicating what is the dispositive factor in deciding

whether

correction-of-error

review is applicable.

or

intermediate

The Supreme Court stated:
-2-

standard

of

[W]hat has developed as the dispositive factor is whether the agency, by virtue of its
experience or expertise, is in a better position than the courts to give effect to the
regulatory objective to be achieved.
Id. at 8, citing in part to Bennett.

The Supreme Court then went

on to state:
We do not defer to the Commission when construing statutory terms or when applying
statutory terms to the facts unless the construction of the statutory language or the
application of the law to the facts should be
subject to the Commission's expertise gleaned
from its accumulated practical, first-hand
experience with the subject matter.
Id., citing Bennett.
Thus, the Supreme Court has set forth that a correction-of-error standard will apply unless the agency has a certain
level of expertise vis-a-vis the issue at hand putting the agency
in a position better than the courts to resolve the issue.
Therefore, in this case, the dispositive question is whether the
Board has a level of expertise in determining "employee" status
under the applicable statute.

The Supreme Court has already

answered this question in the negative, concluding the Board does
not have any expertise in the construction of a statute determining employee status.

In Bennett, the Supreme Court was asked to

review the Board's determination of whether a worker was an
"employee" within the meaning of the Workman's Compensation Laws

-3-

which required the application of statutory standards to given
facts.

In that case, the Supreme Court stated:
Since resolution of the issue is not benefited by Commission expertise or experience,
we do not defer to the Commissions ruling.

Bennett at 429.
Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court has
indicated that on legal issues, the determination as to whether a
correction-of-error standard applies is based, in part, upon the
experience or expertise of the agency, and the Supreme Court has
specifically held that with respect to the issue of the classification of an individual as an employee, that the resolution of
that issue is not benefited by the Boards expertise or experience, and therefore the court will not defer to the Commission's
rulings.
The Supreme Court summarized the applicable standard of
review, as follows:
Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory construction, the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act does not change the standard of
review when the court is in as good a position as the agency to determine the issue or
when the agency has been granted discretion
in interpreting the statute. However, nothing in the language of section 63-46b-16 or
its legislative history suggests that an
agency's decision is entitled to deference
solely on the basis of agency expertise or
experience. Indeed, there is no reference to
agency expertise or experience in the statute
or
the
statute's
legislative
history.
Rather, in granting judicial relief when an
"agency
has
erroneously
interpreted
or

applied the law/ the language of section
63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates that absent a
grant of discretion, a correction-of-error
standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory
term.
Therefore, to the extent that our
cases can be read as granting deference to an
agency's decisions based solely on the agency's expertise and not on a statutory delegation of authority, section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)
constitutes a break from prior law.
[Footnotes omitted].

Morton p. 10.

The opinion of the Court in the present case conflicts
with the standard review as described by the Supreme Court in
Morton.

This Court appears to classify the Board's application

of § 35-4-22(j) (5) to the Board's factual finding as involving
mixed questions of law and fact and does not disturb the Board's
decision because the Court concluded the Board's decision did not
exceed bounds of reasonableness and rationality.

Morton holds

that a correction of error standard is used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term.

There-

fore, this court's conclusion at page 7 that Tasters had a burden
to show that the Board's application did not exceed the bounds of
reasonableness is contrary to the requirement of Morton that this
court should review and correct error and the agency should not
be granted any deference.

-5-

CONCLUSION
Based on the Supreme Court's past decision in Bennett,
concluding

that

the

Board

has

no

expertise

in

construing

statutory provisions, and that the Court is in as good a position
as the agency to review the statute, and based upon the repeated
citations to Bennett as controlling in the Morton decision, Tasters asserts that this Court should apply a correction of error
standard in reviewing the Board's decision in the above-captioned
matter.

Testers request the court to review this case applying

the correction of error standard.
The undersigned counsel for Tasters hereby certifies
that this Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED this _ 3

day of July, 1991.

C^^

GARY E. Dj&CTORMAN "
RICHARD )&. MARSH
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION
FOR REHEARING to the following on this

S> day of July, 1991:

R. Paul VanDam
Utah Attorney General
Winston M. Faux
Special Assistant Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
Industrial Commission of Utah
1234 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

RMM:070291A
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APPENDIX "A"

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
Morton International, Inc.,
Petitioner,

No. 900325
F I L E D
June 2 4 , 1991

v.

Auditing Division of the
Utah State Tax Commission,
Respondent.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

HALL,

Randy M. Grimshaw, Maxwell A. Miller, Richard M.
Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Morton International
R. Paul Van Dam, Brian Tarbet, Salt Lake City, for
State Tax Commission

ChiQf Justice:

Petitioner Morton International, Inc. ("Morton"),
seeks review of the determination of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("the Commission**) that certain expenditures made
in the construction of facilities used in the production of
sodium azide pellets and igniter material ('•production
facilities") are not exempt from sales and use tax under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) or (16) (Supp. 1987).
The facts underlying Morton's claims are not in
dispute. In 1987, Morton began construction of facilities
used in the production of sodium azide pellets and igniter
material, which are components of the crash protection airbag
system used in motor vehicles. The pellets and igniter
material are inserted into small pressure vessels to form
airbag inflaters. When the pellet is ignited, it generates
nitrogen gas, which rapidly inflates the airbag. Morton has
manufactured sodium azide pellets for over a decade. The new
facilities, however, constitute a significant expansion of
this business.
The process of manufacturing sodium azide pellets
and igniter material is unigue and highly specialized. The
chemicals used in the process are extremely energetic,
explosive, and toxic. Accordingly, the facilities were
specifically designed to incorporate safety and environmental

features and support specialized and massive equipment, some
of which is suspended above the floor. For example, separate
facilities were built for each stage of production. This was
done to minimize the risk to personnel, machinery, and equipment in case of fire, explosion, or chemical contaminant
reactions. There are also many environmental features that
are incorporated into the buildings themselves, such as, heavy
metal free areas, special conductive flooring, protective
blast and blowout walls and ceilings, chemical dust collection
filters, and protected double-walled piping and sumps. Many
of the production areas are operated by remote control.
Personnel only enter for maintenance and quality control. Due
to the toxic nature of the materials, personnel are not
allowed in these areas without protective clothing, including
respirators.
On June 26, 1989, Morton initiated this action. By
stipulation, it was agreed that the action would be treated as
a request for refund and formal hearing. A hearing was held
on March 7, 1990. At the hearing, Morton represented that
since 1987, it had paid an excess of $325,000 in sales and use
taxes with respect to the construction of its sodium azide
pellet production facilities. Morton contended that it was
entitled to a refund of sales and use taxes pursuant to
section 59-12-104(15) on the ground that the production
facilities were a "synthetic fuel processing and upgrading
plant" and, alternatively, pursuant to section 59-12-104(16),
on the ground that the production facilities function as, and
essentially are, "equipment." On June 7, 1990, the Commission
issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final
decision determining that the fuel pellets were not a
synthetic fuel and thus the production facilities did not
qualify for an exemption under section 59-12-104(15). The
Commission also determined that Morton's production facilities
were real property and thus the sale of materials used in
construction of the production facilities did not constitute
the sale of equipment under section 59-12-104(16).
On July 27, 1990, Morton filed this petition for
review. The general issue before this court is whether the
Commission erred in concluding that the sale of certain
materials used in the construction of Morton's production
facilities is not exempt from sales and use tax under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) or (16).
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

h* Administrative Procedure Act
The instant case was initiated after January 1, 1988,
and the Commission's decision was reached following a formal
hearing. Therefore, the applicable standard of review of the
Commission's action is set out in the Utah Administrative

No.
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Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16f1 which provides
in pertinent part:
(1) As provided by statute, the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency
action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.

(4) The appellate court shall grant
relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the
following:

(d) the agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law;

(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion
delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the
agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's
prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving
facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or
capricious.
The Commission maintains that section 63-46b-16(4)
grants agencies greater discretion than they had under prior
case law. This argument is based on the language in section
63-46b-16(4) stating that appellate relief can only be
T. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22 (1987) provides:
"(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and
judicial review contained in this chapter are applicable to
all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before an
agency on and after January 1, 1988."

3
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granted if "on the basis of the agency's record- the appellate
court determines that a person has been -substantially
prejudiced.- We have always based our decisions on the
agency's record. Therefore, this requirement does not disturb
prior case law.2 Furthermore, section 63-46b-16(4) deals
with judicial relief, not judicial review. It is clear from
this language that this section does not affect the degree of
deference an appellate court grants to an agency's decision.3
Rather, section 64-46b-16(4) ensures that relief should not be
granted when, although the agency committed error, the error
was harmless. Indeed, the language of section 63-46b-16(4) is
similar to language in rules of procedure and evidence dealing
with harmless error.4 Given this similarity in language, we
conclude that the legislature in enacting section 63-46b-16(4)
intended that the same standard used for determining the
harmfulness of error in appeals from judicial proceedings
should apply to reviews of agency actions. Under this
standard, an error will be harmless if it is -sufficiently
inconsequential that . . . there is no reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.-5
Section 63-46b-16(4)(a) through (h), however,
incorporates standards that appellate courts are to employ
when reviewing allegations of agency error.6 Morton's
2. 5fi£ Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Department of Employment S e c ,
657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982); see also Comments of the Utah
Administrative Law Advisory Committee, Utah A.P.A. at 15 (Code
Co Law Publishers, April 25, 1988) [hereinafter Advisory
Committee].
3. The comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory
Committee state that section 63-46b-16(4) is patterned after
comparable provisions of the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act (-MSAPA-). See Model State Admin. Procedure Act
§ 5-116, 15 U.L.A. 127-30 (1981). Section 5-116 of the
MSAPA requires the showing of substantial prejudice for an
appellate court to grant relief. It is clear from reading the
comments to section 5-116 that the requirement of substantial
prejudice does not require appellate courts to grant
administrative agencies deference. Indeed, the comments state
that appellate courts "may decide that the agency has
erroneously interpreted the law if the court merely disagrees
with the agency's interpretation.4. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R.
Evid. 103(a).
5. State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). In a case
such as the instant case, where we reject the argument that an
agency has erred, this provision has no application.
6. The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted section
63-46b-16(4)(a) through (h) as establishing standards of
review that differ, in some cases, from our prior case law.

5££ Grace Drilling Co, v, Board of Review, 776 p.2d 63, 66-68
(Continued on page 5.)
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claims are based on subsections 63-46b-16(4)(d), (4)(h)(iii),
and (4)(h)(iv). The question presented, therefore, is whether
the standard of review incorporated into these subsections
differs from the standard of review developed in our prior
case law.
B.

Prior Case Law

Prior to the adoption of the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act, the Utah courts developed three levels of
review in connection with agency action. First, agencies*
findings of fact were granted considerable deference and would
not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence.7 Second, a correction-of-error standard, giving
no deference to agencies* decisions, was used to review
agencies* rulings on issues the court characterized as
concerning general law.8 Examples of issues characterized
as questions of general law include rulings concerning
constitutional questions,9 rulings concerning the agency's
(Footnote 6 continued.)
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (different standard for reviewing agency
action based on determination of fact); see also Advisory
Committee at 15; MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at
127-30. But see Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775
P.2d 439, 441-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (same standard for
applying the law). We note that the analysis used in
Pro-Benefit is inconsistent with the analysis expressed in
this opinion.
7. Sfifi/ e.g., Savage Indus. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.
160 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 6 (1991); Hurlev v. Board of Review. 767
P.2d 524, 526 (Utah 1988); Bennett v. Indus. Comm'n, 726 P.2d
427, 429 (Utah 1986); Bio K Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 689
P.2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 1984). See also section 63-46b-16(4)(g)
of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that
a party who is substantially prejudiced by an agency action
can seek judicial relief on the ground that "the agency action
is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court."
8. See Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; Utah Pep *t of
Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah
1983) .
9. See Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; Utah Pep' t of
Admint Serv,, 658 P.2d at 608; R.W. Jones Trucking v. Public
Serv. Comm'n. 649 P.2d 628, 629 (Utah 1982). See also Utah
Administrative Procedure Act section 63-46b-16(4)(a), which
provides that a party who is substantially prejudiced by an
agency action may seek judicial relief on the ground that "the
agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied."

5

No. 900325

jurisdiction or statutory authority,10 rulings concerning
common law principles such as the interpretation of contracts
and certificates,-*-1 and rulings concerning interpretation
of statutes unrelated to the agency*12
The correction-of-error standard was also used to
review an agency's construction of, or application of the
findings of fact to, the statutes which the agency is
empowered to administer—when the agency's experience or
expertise is not helpful in resolving the issue.13 One
example of such a situation is when a question of statutory
interpretation turns on basic legislative intent.14 Other
examples include situations where the agency is construing
ordinary statutory terms within the statutes which they
administer, such as, application of limitation period under
the workers' compensation act,15 and the proper construction of the term -deficiency of service."16 In fact, in
any situation involving the application of the legal rules
to the findings of fact, a correction-of-error standard is
used if the court is as well-suited to determine the issue
as the agency.17
10.

Sfifi# e.g. , Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 608;

Utah Cable Television Operator Ass'n vt Pvblic Serv, Comnrn,
656 P.2d 398, 402-03 (Utah 1982). See also Utah
Administrative Procedure Act section 63-46b-16(4)(b), which
provides that a party who is substantially prejudiced by an
agency action can seek judicial relief on the ground that Hthe
agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute."
11. SSSL Utah Pep't of Admin, Servt/ 658 P.2d at 608; w,s,
Hatch Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809,

811 (Utah 1954).

But see Savage grost inc, vt Public Sery,

Comm'n, 723 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (interpretation of
certificate of public convenience granted deference when
agency's expertise is helpful in interpreting ambiguous and
technical terms).

12.

See generally Huxley/ 767 p.2d at 527; Bennett/ 726 P.2d

at 429. Both cases state that no deference is granted to an
agency's interpretation of statutes or application of
statutory terms to factual situations unless the agency, by
virtue of its expertise, is in a better position to give
effect to the regulatory objective.
13. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at
429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353.
14. See Hurlev, 767 P.2d at 527; Bio K Corp.. 689 P.2d at
1353.
15. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779, 782
(Utah 1984).
16. Big K Corp.. 689 P.2d at 1353.
17. See, e.g.. Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at
429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353.
No. 900325
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Finally, an intermediate standard of review, granting
some deference to the agency's decisions, has been used when
the agency's experience or expertise puts the agency in a
better position to resolve issues concerning the application
of findings of fact to the legal rules governing the case and
the interpretations of the operative provisions of the
statutes the agency is empowered to administer.18 This
standard was also used when it was alleged that the agency
abused the discretion granted to it by statute.19 Under the
intermediate standard of review, appellate courts did not
disturb an agency's decision if the decision was within the
bounds of reasonableness.20
In cases not involving discretion, it has not
always been clear when the intermediate standard of review
should be used.21 In some early cases, we characterized
the issues that are appropriate for the intermediate standard
of review as questions of mixed fact and law22 or,
alternatively, as questions concerning the application of
the law.23 However, issues that are appropriate for the
intermediate standard have also been described as questions
18. SfifiL/ e.g., Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6;
Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional H Q S P . v. Board of
Review, 723 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 1986); Savage Byps, InC,
723 p.2d at 1087; garney v> Department of Employment Sect, 681
P.2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 1984).
19. SS£, e.g., Big K Corp.. 689 P.2d at 1353; Salt fraKe City
Corp. v. Department of Employment S e c . 657 P.2d 1312, 1316
(Utah 1982).
20. See, e.g., Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6;
Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional HQSP., 723 P.2d at
428-29; Utah Deo't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 610.
21. See Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. Compare
Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429 (correction-of-error standard used to
review Industrial Commission's interpretation of "employee")
with Pinter Constr. Corp. v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah
1984) (intermediate standard used to review Industrial
Commission's interpretation of "employee").
22. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional HQSP.,
723 P.2d at 429; Gray v. Department of Employment S e c , 681
P.2d 807, 810 (Utah 1984); Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658
P.2d at 610.
23. Mixed questions of fact and law have been defined as
"•the "application" of the findings of basic fact (e.g., what
happened) to the legal rules governing the case.'" Gray, 681
P.2d at 811 n.7 (quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d
at 610). This court has used the terms mixed question of fact
and law and application of the law interchangeably. See
Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527-28; Logan Regional Hosp.. 723 P.2d at
429; Bgrney, 681 P.2d at 1275; Clearfield Citv v. Department
of Employment Sec., 663 P.2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 1983).

7
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of statutory construction,24 questions of special law,25
and questions of law.26 Indeed, we have stated, "An
agency's interpretation of key provisions of the statute that
it is empowered to administer is often inseparable from its
application of the rules of law to the basic facts."27
A review of our recent cases, however, makes it clear
that it is not the characterization of an issue as a mixed
question of fact and law or the characterization of the issue
as a question of general law that is dispositive of the
determination of the appropriate level of judicial review.
Rather, what has developed as the dispositive factor is
whether the agency, by virtue of its experience or expertise,
is in a better position than the courts to give effect to the
regulatory objective to be achieved*28 We have stated:
We do not defer to the Commission when
construing statutory terms or when applying
statutory terms to the facts unless the
construction of the statutory language or
the application of the law to the facts
should be subject to the Commission's
expertise gleaned from its accumulated
practical, first-hand experience with the
subject matter.29
A clear example of this principle can be seen in Savage
Brothers Inc. v. Public Service Commission.30 There, we
noted that questions involving interpretations of certificates
of public convenience
and necessity ordinarily involve
questions of general law. However, we held that when an
agency has specialized knowledge that is helpful in
interpreting ambiguous and technical terms of a certificate,
an intermediate standard of review is appropriate.31
In determining whether the standards of review
incorporated in subsections 63-46b-16(4)(d), (4)(h)(iii), and
(4)(h)(iv) differ from the standards established in our
24. 3££ Chris & Dick's v. State Tax Comm'n. 791 P.2d 511,
513-14 (Utah 1990); Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429; Big K Corp., 689
P.2d at 1353; Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 610.
25. See Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610.
26. Sfifi Chris & Dick's. 791 P.2d at 513-14; Hurley. 767 P.2d
at 527; Bennett. 726 P.2d at 429; Big K Corp.. 689 P.2d at
1353; Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 610.
27. Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610.
28. Savage Indus,, 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; Chris & Dick's.
791 P.2d at 513-14; Hurley. 767 P.2d at 527; Bfennett, 726 P.2d
at 429; Bio K Corp.. 689 P.2d at 1353.
29. Bennett. 726 P.2d at 429.
30. 723 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986).
31.

JAJU at
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prior case law, we will address each section separately in
the context of the claim raised under that section,
II.
At

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Section 63-46b-3.6(4)(d>

Morton's claim that it is entitled to judicial
relief under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) is based on the
allegation that the Commission erred in its construction of
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) and (16) or in its
application of these subsections to the findings of fact.
Under our prior case law, the standard used to review the
Commission's determinations would be a^correction-of-error
standard unless the Commission was granted—sottief discretion in
dealing with the issue or, by virtue-of^ its expertise or
experience, was in a superior position to decide the issue.
The first question presented, therefore, is whether section
63-46b-16(4) departs from this standard.
It has already been established that in some
situations, the standard of review provided in section
63-46b-16(4)(d) is identical to the standard of review in our
prior case law. In Savage Industries Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Commission.32 we held that under section 63-46b-16(4)(d), a
correction-of-error standard, giving no deference to the
agency decisions, is to be used in cases involving statutory"
construction where the court is in as good a position as the
agency to interpret the statute.33 This holding was based
on the term "erroneous," which connotes a correction-of-error
standard,34 and the legislative history of section
63-46b-16(4)(d), which implies that "•a court may decide that
the agency has erroneously interpreted the law if the court
merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation.•*35
Similarly, section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) provides for judicial
relief in cases where the agency has abused the '•discretion
delegated to the agency by statute."36 In past cases, we
32.

160 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7-8 (Utah 1991).

33.

JAJU at

7.

34. IiL. at 8.
35. JJL. at 8 (citing MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at
128 (1981)).
36. The legislative history of section 63-46b-16(4)(d)
also supports this position. The comments of the Utah
Administrative Procedure Act state that section 63-46b-16(4)(d)
is patterned after comparable provisions in the MSAPA. The
comments to the relevant section of the MSAPA state that "the
enabling statute normally confers some discretion upon the
agency. Accordingly, a court should find reversible error in
the agency's application of the law only if the agency has
improperly exercised its discretion." See MSAPA § 5-116,
comments, 15 U.L.A. at 128.
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have held that an agency has abused its discretion when the
agency's action, viewed in the context of the language and
purpose of the governing statute, is unreasonable.37
Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory
construction, ^the Utah Administrative Procedure Act does not
change the standard of review when the court is in as good a
position as the agency to determine the issue or when the
agency has been granted discretion in interpreting the
statute. However, nothing in the language of section
63-46b-16 or its legislative history suggests that an agency's
decision is entitled to deference solely on the basis of
agency expertise or experience. Indeed, there is no reference
to agency expertise or experience in the statute or the
statute's legislative history. Rather, in granting judicial
relief when an "agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law,- the language of section 63-46b-16(4) clearly
indicates that absent a grant of discretion, a correctionof-error standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory term.38
Therefore, to the extent that our cases can be read as
granting deference to an agency's decisions based solely on
the agency's expertise and not on a statutory delegation of
authority, section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) constitutes a break from
prior law.39
37. See Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Department of Employment
S e c . 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982); West Jordan v.
Department of Employment Sec, 656 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1982);
Gf^ Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658
P.2d 601, 611-12 (Utah 1983). Focusing on the legislative
grant of authority is important in determining whether an
agency has abused its discretion. The court should be careful
not to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency
when considering the wisdom of the agency's policies. See
Advisory Committee at 15; see also MSAPA § 5-116, comments,
15 U.L.A. at 128 (1981).
38. As noted supra in notes 21-27 and accompanying text, in
some of our earlier cases, in determining that an intermediate
standard of review is appropriate, we have relied upon the
characterization of an issue as an application of the law as
opposed to an interpretation of the law. Although in our more
recent cases the focus has turned to agency expertise, the
fact that the Administrative Procedure Act incorporates the
terms "application of the law" and "interpretation of the law"
under a single standard supports the contention that absent a
grant of discretion, an agency's interpretation or application
of statutory terms should be reviewed for error.
39. In fact, the legislative history of the Administrative
Procedure Act suggests that the legislature intended to alter
the approach the courts developed to review agency action.
See Sullivan, Overview of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act, Utah A.P.A. at 4-5 (Code Co Publishers July 8, 1988).
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This, however, may not have a significant effect on
the standard used to review agencies* statutory interpretations
and applications of their own statutes• In many cases where
we would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of
its expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency
deference on.the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of
discretion contained in the governing statute.
The legislature, in many instances, has explicitly
granted agencies discretion in dealing with specific statutory
terms.40 Apart from such explicit grants of authority,
courts have also recognized that grants of discretion may be
implied from the statutory language. For example, we have
held that when the operative terms of a statute are broad and
generalized, these terms "bespeak a legislative intent to
delegate their interpretation to the responsible agency.-41
We have also granted an agency's statutory interpretation
deference when the statutory language suggested that the
legislature had left the specific question at issue
unresolved. In Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Confer.42 we held
that an agency's interpretation of statutory provisions is
entitled to deference when there is more than one permissible reading of the statute and no basis in the statutory
language or the legislative history to prefer one interpretation over another.4^
The approach used in Salt Lake Citv Corp. is
consistent with section 63-46b-16. Questions of legislative
intent are considered questions of law, which are reviewed for
correctness under our prior case law44 and section
63-46b-16(4)(d). Therefore, when a legislative intent
concerning the specific question at issue can be derived
through traditional methods of statutory construction, the
agency's interpretation will be granted no deference and the
statute will be interpreted in accord with its legislative
40. For example, section 59-12-104(16) provides for "sales or
leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by a
manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding
normal operating replacements . . . as determined by the
commission). * (Emphasis added.)
41. Utah Deo't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 610; see also
Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 657 P.2d at 1316-17 (term "equity and
good conscience*1 confers broad discretion) .
42. 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983).
43. Id. at 636. The United States Supreme Court has recently
adopted a similar approach. &&£ Dole v. United Steelworkers
of America. 494 U.S. 26,
, 110 S. Ct. 929, 938 (1990);
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 467 U.S.
837, 841 (1984).
44. See Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6, 8; Hurlev v.
Board of Review. 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).
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intent. 45 However, in the absence of a discernible
legislative intent concerning the specific question in issue,
a choice among permissible interpretations of a statute is
largely a policy determination. The agency that has been
granted authority to administer the statute is the appropriate
body to make -such a determination. 46 Indeed, both the
legislative history to section 63-46b-16 47 and our prior
cases 4 8 suggest that an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for the agency's judgment concerning the
wisdom of the agency's policy. When there is no discernible legislative intent concerning a specific issue the
legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In
such a case, it is appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated authority to the agency to decide the
issue. Such an approach is particularly appropriate when it
is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended the
agency to have some discretion in dealing with the statutory
provision at issue.
We do not mean to suggest that these are the only
methods of determining whether the legislature has granted the
agency discretion in dealing with an issue. However, it is
clear from the wording of section 63-46b-16 that an agency's
statutory construction should only be given deference when
there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the
language in question, either expressly made in the statute or
implied from the statutory language.
B,

Section 59-12-104(15)

Morton's first argument is that the sale of certain
materials, machinery, and equipment used in the construction
of its production facilities is exempt from sales and use tax
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), which provides:
The following sales and uses are exempt
from taxes imposed by this chapter:

(15) sales or leases of materials,
machinery, equipment, and services of any
person in excess of $500,000 for any tax
year used in the new construction,
45. See Savage Indus.. 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8; Hurley. 767
P.2d at 527.
46. Sfifi Salt Lake Citv Corp., 674 P.2d at 636; Utah Dep't of
Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 611.
47. See Advisory Committee at 15; see also MSAPA § 5-116,
comments, 15 U.L.A. at 128.
~~~
48. See Salt Lake Citv Corp., 674 P.2d at 636; Utah Deo't of
Admin. Serv,, 658 P.2d at 611.
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expansion, or modernization (excluding
normal operating replacements as
determined by the commission) of any mine,
mill, reduction works, smelter, refinery
(except oil and gas refineries), synthetic
fuel processing and upgrading plant,
rolling mill, coal washing plant, or
melting facility in Utah commencing after
July 1, 1984, and ending June 30, 1989.49
Morton argues that the sodium azide pellets are synthetic
fuels and that, therefore, Morton's facilities constitute a
-synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant- as that term
is used in section 59-12-104(15).
The question presented is one of statutory
construction or application, and absent a grant of discretion,
the Commission's decision will be reviewed under a correctionof-error standard. The statutory terms in question are of a
specific nature and do not connote a general grant of discretion. Furthermore, the precise issue presented, whether
facilities such as those in question can be considered
synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plants, can be
resolved through the use of traditional rules of statutory
construction.5" It is apparent that the Commission has not
been granted any discretion in regard to the present issue.
Therefore, its interpretation will not be given deference.
Morton's interpretation of section 59-12-104(15) is
based on the well-established rule of statutory construction
that a statutory term should be interpreted and applied
according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary
meaning of the term results in an application that is neither
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction
of the express purpose of the statute.51 It is argued that
the usual meaning of the term -synthetic,- as defined by
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, is -relating to or
involving synthesis; produced artificially; man-made.- The
usual meaning of the term -fuel,- according to Webster's, is a
-material used to produce heat or power by burning.- Morton
then combines these definitions to produce an interpretation
of the term -synthetic fuel- as -a man-made fuel that could be
combusted or consumed to produce heat or light.- Under such
an interpretation of section 59-12-104(15), the sodium azide
pellets would qualify as a synthetic fuel.
49. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (emphasis added).
50. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
51. West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982);
See 3lSQ Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake
City/ 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983); Gord v. Salt Lake Cityr
20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1967).
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While the analysis used in reaching this point
ignores other relevant and well-established rules of statutory
construction, it is not necessary to rely on other rules of
construction to conclude that Mortons interpretation is
erroneous. This is because the rule cited for Morton's
interpretation does not support its position. First, it is
apparent from the record that there is no usual and accepted
meaning of the term -synthetic fuel." Testimony at the
hearing established that there is conflict within the
scientific community concerning the accepted meaning of the
term. Indeed, in several points in its brief, Morton claims
that there is confusion concerning the accepted meaning of the
term "synthetic fuel." Though we have relied on dictionary
definitions to determine the usual meaning of statutory terms,
the term "synthetic fuel" is not defined in the dictionary.
When it is admitted that there is no accepted meaning of the
statutory term at issue, a method of construction which is
based solely on one of many possible definitions is
inappropriate.
Second, even assuming that Morton's definition is
appropriate, the argument necessarily fails because Morton
misapplies the rule. Morton argues that despite the confusion
as to the meaning of -synthetic fuel,- the term should be
defined by combining the strict dictionary definitions of
-synthetic- and -fuel.- Under such a definition, any man-made
material capable of burning would qualify as a synthetic
fuel. Taking Morton's analysis one step further, any facility
that produces a material capable of burning would qualify as a
-synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant.- Morton
attempts to avoid such a result by arguing that a requirement
not found in the definition of either -synthetic" or "fuel"—
the requirement that it must be economical to produce heat or
energy from a man-made material—should be read into the
definition of "synthetic fuel." Morton claims that such an
interpretation is justified in order to avoid absurd results.
This argument, however, is a misstatement of the very rule
upon which Morton relies. When the use of an ordinary meaning
of a statutory term results in a statute that is "confused
beyond reason,"52 the court does not resolve the confusion
by modifying the ordinary meaning of the term. Rather, in
such cases the method of construction urged by Morton is not
employed.53
However, other methods of construction can be used to
determine the application of the phrase "synthetic fuel
processing and upgrading plant" when the meaning of the phrase
cannot be arrived at through use of the usual meaning of the
term. One such method of statutory construction is the rule
52. Gord, 434 P.2d at 451.
53. See Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist.. 659 P.2d at
1035; Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446; Gord, 434 P.2d at 451.

No. 900325

14

of noscitur a sociis, which provides that the meaning of
questionable words and phrases in a statute be ascertained by
reference to words or phrases associated with them.54 The
terms surrounding "synthetic fuel processing and upgrading
plant" all relate to different aspects of the mining or
material reclamation operations. This suggests that the term
"synthetic fuel upgrading and processing plant" should be
interpreted in accordance with the term's relationship to the
mining industry. Such an approach is also consistent with the
legislative history of section 59-12-104(15). Both Morton and
the Commission assert that the legislative history reveals
that section 59-12-104(15) was enacted to aid Utah's ailing
mining industry.
At the hearing, Dr. Wiser, a professor of fuel
engineering at the University of Utah, offered a definition of
"synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant" that is
consistent with the language and legislative history of
section 59-12-104(15). Dr. Wiser stated that in the synthetic
fuel industry, the term "synthetic fuel processing and
upgrading plant" refers to a plant which produces a liquid
material that can be further refined into a synthetic fuel by
removing the impurities from raw materials other than
petroleum and natural gas, such as coal, tar sands, oil shale,
and organic waste. Dr. Wiser further testified that a
synthetic fuel is a liquid or gaseous material produced from
such raw materials used in combustion primarily for the
production of energy. The requirement that a synthetic fuel
be gaseous or liquid is linked to the purpose of developing
synthetic fuels, which is to take the pressure off of
petroleum and natural gas and to reduce dependence on foreign
oil.
This definition, to the extent that it focuses on
mined materials such as coal, tar sands, and oil shale, is
consistent with the language and legislative history of
section 59-12-104(15). Because the definition offered by
Dr. Wiser focuses on "processing and upgrading plant" as well
as "synthetic fuel," it is also consistent with the rule of
statutory construction which provides that terms of a statute
are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a
piecemeal fashion.55 It should also be noted that this
narrow definition limits the exception granted under section
59-12-104(15). Therefore, the approach suggested by Dr. Wiser
54. Sfift Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839, 840
(1962); W.S. Hatch Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 3 Utah 2d 7,
277 P.2d 809, 812 (1954); Perris v. Perris. 115 Utah 128, 202
P.2d 731, 733 (1949); see also Dole, 494 U.S. at
, 110 S.
Ct. at 935.
55. Clover v. Snowbird, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991); Peay
vt Bpgrd gf Educt Qt ProvQ City Schools, 14 Utah 2d 63, 377
P.2d 490, 492 (1962).
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is consistent with the well-established principle that tax
exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against the
party claiming the exemption and all ambiguities are to be
resolved in favor of taxation,56
There is ample support from the wording of the
statute, the statute's legislative history, and other methods
of statutory construction to conclude that the legislature, in
enacting section 59-12-104(15), intended to grant an exemption
for materials used in the construction of the type of plant
Dr. Wiser described: that is, a plant which removes
impurities from natural resources such as coal, oil shale, and
tar sands to produce a liquid or gaseous material meant to be
used in combustion for the production of energy. It is also
clear that given this construction, Morton's production
facilities do not qualify as a synthetic fuel processing and
upgrading plant. The Commission, therefore, did not err in
determining that the materials used in the construction of
Morton's facilities do not qualify for an exemption under
section 59-12-104(15).
C.

Section 59-12-104(16)

Morton argues that the shells of its production
facilities, i.e., the foundations, walls, floors, and
ceilings, constitute equipment. Therefore, the construction
of the facilities constitutes a purchase of equipment under "
59-12-104(16), which provides:
The following sales and use are exempt from
taxes imposed by the chapter:

(16) sales or leases of machinery and
equipment purchased or leased by a
manufacturer for use in new or expanding
operations (excluding normal operating
replacements, which includes replacement
machinery and equipment even though they
may increase plant production or capacity,
as determined by the commission) in any
manufacturing facility in Utah.-*7
Morton's argument is based on the assertion that the shells
of its production facilities function as equipment by
56. Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617
P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980); Great Salt Lake Minerals v. State
Tax Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake County v.

Tax copun'n, Utah ex rei, good Shepherd Lutheran Church, 54 8
P.2d 630, 631 (Utah 1976).
57. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (emphasis added).
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preventing, localizing, and directing accidental explosions,
preventing toxic exposure to workers and the environment,
providing structural support for specialized pieces of
machinery, and providing access to machinery. The Commission
rejected this argument, determining that the facilities
constitute real property not subject to an exemption under
section 59-12-104(16).
The specific issue presented on appeal, therefore,
is whether the term "equipment," as used in section
59-12-104(16), refers to structures that have characteristics of improvements to real property, but also have
characteristics of equipment in that they provide safety
features, support for machinery, and access to machinery.
This is a question of statutory construction or application
and absent a grant of discretion, the Commission's decision
will be reviewed for correctness.58
There is no explicit grant of authority regarding
the question of what constitutes "equipment" under section
59-12-104(16). It is also true that the precise question at
issue cannot be resolved using traditional methods of
statutory construction. The usual meaning of the term
"equipment" is fixed assets of a business enterprise not
including real property and buildings.59 This, however,
does not resolve the issue. Morton does not claim that
buildings should qualify as an exemption under section
59-12-104(16). Rather, Morton's argument is that the shells
of its production facilities are so specialized and so
intricately connected to the function of the machinery that
they do not constitute buildings, in the traditional sense,
but are essentially equipment. The other terms of the
statute are not helpful, and the legislative history is not,
as in the case of section 59-12-104(15), specific enough to
provide much guidance.60
Indeed, it seems that the legislature left
unresolved the more general question of whether structures
having characteristics of real property as well as
characteristics of equipment can qualify for an exemption
58.

Sfifi Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4).

59.

Sea Webster's New Third International Dictionary 768

(14th ed. 1961).
60. The legislative history of section 59-12-104(16) suggests
that the section was enacted to provide incentives for the
expansion of manufacturing plants. Morton claims that since
the act was meant to provide incentives to manufacturers, the
term "equipment" should be given an expansive interpretation;
such an assertion is controverted by the rule that tax
exemption statutes are to be strictly construed. See Parson
ASphgU Prods. InqT/ 617 P.2d at 398; Great Salt Lake
Minerals, 573 P.2d at 340; Salt Lake County, 548 P.2d at 631.
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under section 59-12-104(16), let alone the more specific
issue asserted in this appeal. It should also be noted that
the classification of a structure as real property or
equipment is the type of determination the Commission
routinely performs. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
the legislature granted the Commission discretion in this
area. Given these facts, we conclude that the Commission has
been granted discretion in interpreting the term "equipment."
The decision of the Commission, therefore, will only be
overturned if it is unreasonable.61
In determining whether the Commission's decision is
reasonable, it must be noted that the Commission has promulgated a rule that expressly excludes real property and
improvements to real property from the definition of
equipment, as that term is used in section 59-12-104(16).
Rule 865-19-85S provides:
2. "Equipment" means any independent
device separated from any machinery but
essential to an integrated or continuous
manufacturing or assembling process or any
sub unit thereof . . . .

B. Application of Exemption:
1. The machinery and equipment
exemption applies only to tangible personal
property. It does not apply to real
property or to tangible personal property
which is purchased and becomes an
improvement to real property.
Morton does not challenge the propriety of rule 865-19-85S.
In fact, Morton's argument relies heavily on the language of
the rule.62
61. See suora notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
62. Because Morton asserts that the Commission erred in
interpreting section 59-12-104(16), the Commission's
determination must be reviewed under section 64-46b-16(4)(d)
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Morton's argument,
however, relies more on the wording of rule 865-19-85S than on
the language of section 59-12-104(16). The instant case,
therefore, may present a situation more appropriately reviewed
under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, i.e., the agency's action is "contrary to a
rule of the agency," rather than under section 64-46b-16(4)(d).
Morton has not asserted this claim. In any event, since we
have already held that the Commission has been granted
(Continued on page 19.)
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Morton argues that because the term "equipment" is
not defined in the tax code or Utah case law, this court
should look to other jurisdictions for guidance.
Specifically/ Morton cites cases from Wisconsin63 and the
federal bench64 that have focused on the function that the
particular structure performs in determining if the structure
should be considered equipment.6^ it is argued that we
should adopt this approach because it was developed under
statutes that are similar to rule 865-19-85S, that is, tax
statutes granting exemptions for machinery and equipment but
not for building or building structures.6^ Implicit in
Morton's argument is the assertion that under a functional
analysis, the facilities in question would qualify as
equipment.
There are, however, many difficulties with Morton's
argument. It is rule 865-19-85S, not section 59-12-104(16),
that is similar to the statutes cited by Morton. Yet Morton
has cited no cases where this court has looked to another
jurisdiction's statutes to aid in the interpretation of an
agency's rule. In situations like the instant case, where
the Commission has been granted discretion to interpret the
term -equipment" and therefore discretion in interpreting
rule 865-19-85S,67 other jurisdictions' rulings are not as
salient as they may be in situations dealing with strict
(Footnote 62 continued.)
discretion in interpreting the term -equipment,* as used in
section 59-12-104(16), and rule 865-19-85S defines the term at
issue, it is clear that in this case a reasonableness standard
should be used under either section of the Administrative
Procedure Act. See supra notes 18-20, 36-37, and accompanying

text.

See generally Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v,

Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982); Utah Hotel Co, v,
Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467, 470 (1944).
63. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Citv of Milwaukee, 125 Wis. 2d 437,
373 N.W.2d 680, 687-89 (Ct. App. 1985); Ladish Malting Co. v.
Wisconsin Deo't of Revenue. 98 Wis. 2d 496, 297 N.W.2d 56, 62
(Ct. App. 1980).
64. Thirup v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 508 F.2d 915,
918 (9th Cir. 1974).
65. Morton asserts that under the functional analysis the
determination of whether property is equipment or real property
is made using a three-step approach: first, annexation (how
is the property attached?); second, adaptation (what is the
function or purpose of the property?); and third, intent (did
the owner intend the property to remain tangible personal
property permanently attached to real estate, or did the owner
intend the property to be real property?).
66. See Thirup, 915 F.2d at 917; Pabst Brewing Co.. 373
N.W.2d at 684; Ladish Malting Co.. 297 N.W.2d at 56.
67. See generally Concerned Parents of Stepchildren, 645 P.2d
at 633; Utah Hotel Co., 151 P.2d at 470.
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statutory construction. Furthermore, though there are
similarities between rule 865-19-85S and the statutes Morton
cites, the statutes and rule 865-19-85S are not identical.
None of the statutes upon which Morton relies involve sales
and use tax. Moreover, under rule 865-19-85S, the tax
exemption does not apply to real property and improvements to
real property, while under the statutes Morton cites the tax
exemption does not apply to the arguably narrower term of
buildings and building structures.°8
We also note that the case law from other
jurisdictions is at best conflicting in this area.69 There
are jurisdictions that have not followed a functional approach
in interpreting similar statutes.70 Furthermore, the
jurisdictions that have adopted a functional approach have
reached conflicting conclusions.71 Therefore, even if we
held that section 59-12-104(16) contemplates a functional
approach in determining whether a structure was equipment or
real property, it would not necessarily follow that Morton's
facilities would constitute equipment. It was established at
the hearing that the functional analysis urged by Morton is
often "very nebulous.- Indeed, it is entirely possible that
the Commission agreed with Morton's approach but disagreed
with Morton's conclusion.
Given the language of rule 865-19-85S, the
discrepancies between rule 865-19-85S and the statutes Morton
cites, and the conflicting case law, the Commission's
determination that the shells of Morton's facilities do not
constitute equipment is not unreasonable. Therefore, the
Commission's determination will not be disturbed.
68. See Thirup, 508 F.2d at 917; Pabst Brewing Co.. 373
N.W.2d at 684; Ladish Malting Co., 297 N.W.2d at 56.
69. The Commission cites several cases which define the term
"real property." Under these definitions, it is clear that
Morton's facilities would qualify as real property. Thus,
they would not qualify for an exemption under rule
865-19-85S. See National Lead Co. v. Borough of Sayerville,
132 N.J. Super. 30, 331 A.2d 633, 637 (1975); Strobel v.
Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins., 152 N.W.2d 794, 796 (N.D. 1967); In
re Inolis, 69 Okla. 64, 169 P. 1083, 1084 (1917); Sanchez v.
Brandt, 567 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. 1978).

70.

5£fi Ggeeo Circle Growers inc, v, Lorain County Bfly of

Revision, 35 Ohio St. 3d 38, 517 N.E.2d 899, 900 (1988).
71. Compare Thirup, 508 P.2d at 920 (under functional
approach, greenhouse constitutes equipment) with Busch v.
County of Hennepin, 380 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1986) (under
functional approach greenhouse does not constitute
equipment). See also Crown Coco Inc. v. Commissioner of
Revenue, 336 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn. 1983) (metal canopy over
gasoline pumps does not constitute equipment).
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III.

SECTION 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)

Morton also claims that it is entitled to relief
under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)/ which provides for
judicial relief when the "agency action is . . . contrary to
the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency." Neither
Morton nor the Commission has cited any case law relating to
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). Indeed, it appears that there
is no Utah case law that follows an approach analogous to the
approach set out in this section. Moreover, the legislative
history concerning this section is confused and therefore not
helpful in interpreting the section.72 Given these facts,
we do not engage in an in-depth analysis of the section.
Morton claims that the Commission, in determining
that the shells of its production facilities are real property, took action that was contrary to its prior practice of
characterizing similar structures as tangible personal
property. This allegation is based on the testimony of
Mr. Anderson, an auditor who had formerly worked for the tax
Commission who testified that he was aware of various
instances where walls, flooring, and roofs of automatic
storage facilities and large oil storage tanks were treated as
tangible personal property. The Commission, in determining
that the facilities in question are real property, did not
distinguish the instant case from situations involving
automatic storage facilities or oil storage tanks. The
question presented, therefore, is whether Mr. Anderson's
testimony establishes prior inconsistent agency practice for
the purpose of section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). If the testimony
establishes prior inconsistent agency practice, Morton would
be entitled- to relief under this section due to the
Commission's failure to provide a "rational basis for the
inconsistency.w
72. The comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory
Committee state that section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) is patterned
after section 5-116(8)(iii) of the MSAPA. See Advisory
Committee at 15. The comment to section 5-116(8)(iii)
provides that section 5-116(8)(iii) is related to section
2-103, which requires agencies to make an index of their final
orders and to make this index available for public inspection
and copying. Under the MSAPA's scheme, a -party may invoke
the indexing and public access requirement of Section 2-102,
for the purpose of ascertaining the agency's prior practice,
so as to reveal the inconsistency between the challenged
agency action and prior agency practice." See MSAPA § 5-116,
comments, 15 U.L.A. at 129. Utah, however, has not enacted a
provision similar to section 2-102. Due to the conflict
between this legislative history and Utah's statutory scheme,
legislative history cannot be relied on to a great extent in
interpreting section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).
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In approaching this issue, it is important to note
the exact nature of the evidence presented at the hearing.
Mr. Anderson did not testify that the Commission, in a formal
or informal hearing, classified oil storage tanks and
automatic storage facilities as tangible personal property.
Rather, it is apparent from the record that Mr. Anderson was
referring to individual audits.73 Indeed, he testified that
the method used in determining that the tanks and storage
facilities were tangible personal property was "not an
official guideline." Furthermore, the auditing division did
not consistently classify such structures as equipment, but
also classified such structures as real property. This
inconsistency was due to the fact that there was no
well-established policy regarding the classification of these
structures.
Although there is limited law on point,74 it is
clear that in the absence of an official guideline or a
well-established policy, the decisions of auditors do not
constitute "agency practice" for the purpose of section
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).75 To hold otherwise would be to bind
the Commission by the unappealed decisions of its subordinates. It is the Commission that has been granted authority
to administer the tax code.76 Morton has provided no
evidence that the Commission itself has acted contrary to the
position it has taken in the instant case. Under Morton's
approach, the mere fact that there is conflict within an
agency on a particular question would be sufficient to justify
judicial relief under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). Due to
the presence of a conflict, no matter how the issue is finally
resolved, the decision will be inconsistent with some of the
decisions of the agency's lower level employees. In recognizing the Commission's authority to administer the tax code,
section 63-46b-16 recognizes the Commission's authority over
its own employees. Since Morton failed to establish prior
agency practice contrary to the agency's action, the
Commission's determination cannot be overturned on the basis
of section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).

73. Although it is not clear, it appears from the record that
the classification of these structures as tangible personable
property occurred in audits concerning Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-103, not Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16).
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75. It may be important to note that we are not deciding
whether the classification of oil storage tanks and walls,
ceilings, and floors of automatic storage facilities as
tangible personal property is inconsistent with the
classification of shells of Morton's facilities as real
property.
76. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-201 to -210.
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IV.

SECTION 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)

Morton's remaining contention is that the
Commission's determination that the shells of its production
facilities do not constitute equipment is not supported by the
record and is therefore arbitrary and capricious. It is
argued that for this reason Morton is entitled to relief under
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv).77 However, an analysis of the
section is unnecessary because it is clear that the record
supports the Commission's determination.
It is argued that because Morton produced a witness
who testified that in his opinion the shells of the facilities
in question constituted equipment and no other witness contradicted this testimony, the Commission is not free to disagree
with this opinion. Morton's witness formed his opinion by
applying his interpretation of rule 865-19-85S and section
59-12-104(16) to the undisputed facts. Since the facts are
indeed undisputed, his opinion is simply a legal conclusion.
While the Commission is not free to make findings of fact
outside the scope of the evidence presented at the hearing,78
the Commission is free to disagree with the legal conclusions
offered by witnesses, even when those conclusions are uncontroverted. It is undisputed that sufficient factual evidence was
presented at the hearing, and it has been established that the
Commission did not abuse its discretion in dealing with
section 59-12-104(16). The Commission's decision, therefore,
is supported by the record.
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the
Commission did not err in determining that expenditures made
in the construction of Morton's sodium azide pellets
facilities do not qualify for an exemption under section
59-12-104(15) and (16).
Affirmed.

r ^ -*"'

i

77. Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) provides for judicial relief
when an agency's actions are "otherwise arbitrary or
capricious."
78. First flat'l Bank of Boston v. County gdt of Equalisation,
799 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Utah 1990).
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WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result
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